Indonesia -Iron or Steel Products Third Participant Written Submission DS490/DS496
by the European Union -3-
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
A. Characterisation of the measure at issue
1.
The European Union considers that the Panel was right to consider on its own motion whether the measure at issue constituted a safeguard measure. A panel's obligation to "make an objective assessment of the matter" pursuant to Article 11 comprises the assessment of the applicability of the covered Agreement. The applicability of the provisions which the complainant alleges to be breached is an important part of its prima facie case. Thus, where a panel has doubts about this element, it should examine it on its own motion, regardless of whether or not the parties have raised arguments about it. The fact that an issue is not disputed between the parties does not preclude the panel from examining it and coming to an interpretation which differs from the concurring view of the parties, in line with the general principle jura novit curia. The issue is to be distinguished from the question whether a panel can address claims which have not been made by the complainant, which it cannot.
2.
However, where a panel intends to deviate fundamentally from qualifications shared by both parties, it is obliged to give parties ample opportunity to present their views on that question before the issue is actually adjudicated. This flows from the fundamental principle of due process, which includes the right to be heard, i.e. for parties to have an adequate opportunity to pursue their claims, make out their defences, and establish the facts.
B. The characterisation of the measure on substance

3.
To understand what a safeguard measure is, it is required a harmonious reading of the Agreement on Safeguards and Article XIX of GATT 1994.
1
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4.
The European Union notes that there are two defining features of a safeguard measure: "suspend the obligation" and "withdraw or modify the concession". The other conditions in Article XIX, whilst not sine qua non, may nevertheless serve as confirming hallmarks: increased quantities; like/competitive product; injury;
causation.
C. The stand-alone MFN violation
5.
A panel's terms of reference must be objectively determined on the basis of the panel request as it existed at the time of filing; subsequent submissions cannot cure a defect in a panel request. In the present case, the European Union considers that in the circumstances of the case, the co-complainants' panel requests (although being very broad and general on their face) can only be understood as setting out the case as a case against a safeguard measure. 
8.
We first address Indonesia's claims that the Panel was not allowed to look into the qualification of the measure as safeguard measure, then the actual qualification of the measure on substance. Finally we will comment on Indonesia's claims that the Panel exceeded its terms of reference by addressing the MFN claim as a standalone violation.
III. CHARACTERISATION OF THE MEASURE AT ISSUE AS PART OF THE PANEL'S "OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT"
A. Panel' findings
9.
The Panel started its analysis by examining whether the specific duty on imports of galvalume constituted a "safeguard measure" within the meaning of Article 1 of the Safeguards Agreement. It noted that neither Party disputed the characterisation. On the contrary, the Parties concurred that it should be characterised as safeguard measure. Nevertheless the Panel considered that it was obliged to "examine this issue for ourselves" "in discharging our duty to undertake 'an objective assessment of the matter'" 2 .
B. Arguments of the Participants
10.
Indonesia posits Indonesia's appellant submission, Section IV. indicates that it has decided not to address this issue, because it takes the position that the specific duty is a safeguard measure 7 .
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C. Observations of the European Union
Ex officio assessment of the applicability of a covered Agreement
13.
The European Union considers that the Panel was in principle right in examining on its own motion whether the measure at issue qualified as a safeguard measure.
Article 11 of DSU imposes upon panels a comprehensive obligation to make an "objective assessment of the matter", which embraces all aspects of a panel's examination of the matter, both factual and legal. This comprises an objective assessment of the applicability of the covered agreements, where the panel is 4 Vietnam's appellee submission, Section 5.
5
Vietnam's appellee submission, para. 5.9. Vietnam's appellee submission, paras. 5.13-5.14.
7
TPKM's appellee submission, para. 1.2. Appellate Body Report, Canada -Autos, para. 152 ("Article II:1 of the GATS states expressly that it applies only to "any measure covered by this Agreement". This explicit reference to the scope of the GATS confirms that the measure at issue must be found to be a measure "affecting trade in services" within the meaning of Article I:1, and thus covered by the GATS, before any further examination of consistency with Article II can logically be made. We find, therefore, that the Panel should have inquired, as a threshold question, into whether the measure is within the scope of the GATS by examining whether the import duty exemption is a measure "affecting trade in services" within the meaning of Article I. In failing to do so, the Panel erred in its interpretative approach.") . The applicability to the measure at issue of the Agreement which the challenged measure is alleged to have breached is a fundamental element of the prima facie case that a complainant must make, and must, as such, be looked into by the panel seeking to satisfy itself that the complainant has established a prima facie case 14 .
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19.
The fact that an issue is not disputed between the parties does not preclude the panel from examining this issue objectively and coming to an interpretation which 13 Appellate Body Reports, EC -Hormones, para. 156 ("A panel might well be unable to carry out an objective assessment of the matter, as mandated by Article 11 of DSU, if in its reasoning it had to restrict itself to arguments presented by the parties to the dispute."); Chile -Price Band System, paras. 166-168; US -Certain EC Products, para. 123; see also Panel Report, Australia -Automotive Leather II (Article 21.5 -US), para. 6.19 ("That neither party has argued a particular interpretation before us, and indeed, that both have argued that we should not reach issues of interpretation that they have not raised, cannot, in our view, preclude us from considering such issues if we find this to be necessary to resolve the dispute that is before us. A panel's interpretation of the text of a relevant WTO Agreement cannot be limited by the particular arguments of the parties to a dispute.") 14 See also Panel Report, US -Shrimp (Ecuador), paras. 7.9 and 7.11. 
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20.
The European Union recalls that the Appellate Body has previously held that the characterisation of a measure under a Member's municipal law is not dispositive.
In US -Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint) the Appellate Body stated that:
The US legislative and regulatory framework indicates that procurement contracts are the instruments used when the US Government intends to make a purchase. The label given to an instrument under municipal law, however, is not dispositive and cannot be the end of our analysis […] . 17 (footnotes omitted)
Similarly, in Canada -Renewable Energy / Canada -Feed-in Tariff Program
the Appellate Body confirmed that:
Finally, Japan suggests that the Panel erred by assuming that, if a measure is characterized in a particular manner under domestic law (e.g. as a government purchase), it can never be characterized in a different manner under WTO law. We understand Japan to be arguing that the Panel erred in finding that the characterization of a measure under domestic law is dispositive of its legal characterization under WTO law. Japan is correct in arguing that the manner in which municipal law characterizes a measure is not determinative for its characterization under the covered agreements. 18 (footnotes omitted)
22.
As any other Court, WTO panels (and the Appellate Body) have the duty to ascertain and apply the law to the circumstances of the case, independently of the views and arguments proffered by the parties, jura novit curia
19
. The assessment whether something is a "safeguard measure" is, in the same way as the assessment whether something is a "measure" at all, a legal characterisation and not just a factual one 20 , which a panel can and must thus do on its own motion. 
IV. THE CHARACTERISATION OF THE MEASURE ON SUBSTANCE
A. The Panel's findings
30.
By corroborating the provisions of Article 1 of Agreement on Safeguards and of Article XIX:1(a) of GATT 1994 the Panel found that:
[T]he "measures provided for" in Article XIX:1(a) are measures that suspend a GATT obligation and/or withdraw or modify a GATT concession, in situations where, as a result of a Member's WTO commitments and developments that were "unforeseen" at the time that it undertook those commitments, a product "is being imported" into a Member's territory in "such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products". 
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by the European Union -15-"withdrawal" or "modification" of GATT concessions, which is taken with a view to preventing or remedying serious injury to the domestic industry or threat thereof, and facilitating the adjustment of the domestic industry. Vietnam's other appellant submission, paras. 3.11 -3.23.
37
Vietnam's other appellant submission, paras. 3.57.
38
The European Union agrees that Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards should be interpreted harmoniously, as they constitute an integrated package of rights and disciplines. See Panel Report, Dominican Republic -Safeguard Measures, para. 7.66.
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by the European Union -16-domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the [Member] shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
45.
To understand what a safeguard measure is, we must discount the conditions (increased quantities; like/competitive product; injury; causation). Otherwise, by simply not complying with one of the conditions, an importing Member could take its measures completely outside the scope of the Agreement on Safeguards. Thus, the European Union notes that there are two defining features standing out:
"suspend the obligation" and "withdraw or modify the concession".
46.
As per the title of Article XIX of GATT 1994, a safeguard measure must relate to "imports of particular products". The European Union considers that this has two implications: first, it must apply to "imports of particular products" and second, it must be in some sense a response to "imports of particular products".
47.
Also according to the very title of Article XIX a safeguard measures involves "action", that meaning that it cannot be an omission.
48.
Equally, as there is a sense of urgency in the very nature of a safeguards measure, in principle it will not qualify a measure that has been previously in place for a very long time. Indeed, it has to be some element of "emergency" in the action.
This translates in terms of the temporal relationship between the "imports of particular products" that trigger the safeguard and the "imports of particular products" to which the safeguard is applied.
49.
The other conditions in Article XIX, whilst not sine qua non, may nevertheless serve as confirming hallmarks: increased quantities; like/competitive product; injury; causation.
The European Union disagrees with Indonesia's proposition that assuming
arguendo that a measure at issue does not result in the suspension of any obligation under the GATT 1994, that measure can still be characterized as a safeguard measure within the meaning of Article XIX.
39
The phrase "shall be free" 39 Indonesia's appellant submission, para. 39.
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Member has the discretion to or not to suspend a WTO concession or obligation when imposing a safeguard measure, but simply means that such an action can be taken in exceptional circumstances.
51.
Without taking at this stage a position on the facts of this case, the European Union hopes that it provided helpful elements of analysis to the Appellate Body.
V. INDONESIA'S CLAIM THAT THE STAND-ALONE MFN VIOLATION WAS OUTSIDE THE PANEL'S TERMS OF REFERENCE
A. Panel's findings
52.
After finding that the measure at issue did not constitute a safeguard measure and Vietnam's appellee submission, Section 3.1.; TPKM's appellee submission, Section 3.1.
45
Vietnam's appellee submission, Section 3.2; TPKM's appellee submission, Section 3.2. will often, predetermine how the complainant frames its case, i.e., the required explanation how and why the measure violates specific provisions of a covered
Agreement. It will thereby be relevant for the scope of the terms of reference, and insofar, be more than a mere argument to sustain the claims.
63.
In the present case, it is doubtful whether the panel request met this requirement of explaining how or why the measure is supposed to have violated the provisions it allegedly breaches. As set out above, it was clear that the measure was attacked as a safeguard measure. Under this premise, it was also clear for everybody that Panel's findings in that respect seem not to be covered by its terms of reference.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
67.
The European Union considers that this case raises important systemic issues. The
European Union requests the Appellate Body to carefully review the claims in light of the observations made in this submission.
***
